Flood impacts on a water distribution network by Arrighi, C. et al.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 17, 2109–2123, 2017
https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-17-2109-2017
© Author(s) 2017. This work is distributed under
the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Flood impacts on a water distribution network
Chiara Arrighi1, Fabio Tarani2, Enrico Vicario2, and Fabio Castelli1
1Università di Firenze, DICEA, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Firenze, Italy
2Università di Firenze, DINFO, Department of Information Engineering, Firenze, Italy
Correspondence to: Chiara Arrighi (chiara.arrighi@dicea.unifi.it)
Received: 7 June 2017 – Discussion started: 19 June 2017
Revised: 25 September 2017 – Accepted: 25 October 2017 – Published: 1 December 2017
Abstract. Floods cause damage to people, buildings and in-
frastructures. Water distribution systems are particularly ex-
posed, since water treatment plants are often located next to
the rivers. Failure of the system leads to both direct losses,
for instance damage to equipment and pipework contamina-
tion, and indirect impact, since it may lead to service disrup-
tion and thus affect populations far from the event through
the functional dependencies of the network. In this work, we
present an analysis of direct and indirect damages on a drink-
ing water supply system, considering the hazard of river-
ine flooding as well as the exposure and vulnerability of ac-
tive system components. The method is based on interweav-
ing, through a semi-automated GIS procedure, a flood model
and an EPANET-based pipe network model with a pressure-
driven demand approach, which is needed when modelling
water distribution networks in highly off-design conditions.
Impact measures are defined and estimated so as to quantify
service outage and potential pipe contamination. The method
is applied to the water supply system of the city of Florence,
Italy, serving approximately 380 000 inhabitants. The evalua-
tion of flood impact on the water distribution network is car-
ried out for different events with assigned recurrence inter-
vals. Vulnerable elements exposed to the flood are identified
and analysed in order to estimate their residual functional-
ity and to simulate failure scenarios. Results show that in the
worst failure scenario (no residual functionality of the lift-
ing station and a 500-year flood), 420 km of pipework would
require disinfection with an estimated cost of EUR 21 mil-
lion, which is about 0.5 % of the direct flood losses evaluated
for buildings and contents. Moreover, if flood impacts on the
water distribution network are considered, the population af-
fected by the flood is up to 3 times the population directly
flooded.
1 Introduction
Extreme weather events and major natural disasters are listed
in the top five global risks in terms of likelihood and impact
(World Economic Forum, 2017). Climate change perspec-
tives (IPCC, 2013; Lung et al., 2013) raise additional con-
cerns about floods due to their consequences on population
(Ashley and Ashley, 2008), environment (Christodoulou,
2011), urban areas and infrastructures (Meyer et al., 2013;
Emanuelsson et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2015; Short et al.,
2012). This leads to an increasing interest in studying flood
impacts, as shown, for instance, by the sustainability criteria
adopted for flood risk mitigation strategies in EU countries
(EU Parliament, 2007), which promotes quantitative flood
risk assessment (Merz et al., 2010) and flood damage maps
(de Moel et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2013).
Flood damage to structures and infrastructures is classified
into direct and indirect, the former being caused by physi-
cal contact with floodwater and the latter occurring far from
the event in either space or time (Thieken et al., 2006). On
the one hand, direct losses to private dwellings, household
contents and economic activities can be estimated through
damage curves, which relate water depth to relative losses
(Smith, 1994); on the other hand, interdependence of as-
sets in network infrastructures induces impacts outside the
flooded areas, sometimes with substantial effects (Gil and
Steinbach, 2008). Hence, the assessment of flood impact on
networks partially in direct contact with water requires the
evaluation of the repercussions on the overall system be-
haviour. As a matter of fact, failure of crucial infrastructures
may lead to cascade events and trigger technological disas-
ters (Cruz et al., 2004). Cascading events are more likely to
occur during a natural disaster than during normal plant op-
eration because of the increased chance of multiple, simul-
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taneous failures. While flood damage evaluation to buildings
and their contents is becoming increasingly available (Merz
et al., 2010), the quantification of direct and indirect impacts
on critical infrastructures is less common (Lhomme et al.,
2013; Michielsen et al., 2016; Emanuelsson et al., 2014).
The assessment of flood risk requires the evaluation of the
three risk components – i.e. hazard, vulnerability and expo-
sure – for each subsystem and the assessment of functional
dependencies (Serre et al., 2011). In particular, flood hazard
of a component relates to the likelihood of being flooded,
which can be evaluated through flood maps; exposure is the
position with respect to inundation extent and vulnerability is
the proneness to being harmed (Meyer and Messner, 2005).
Vulnerability of a network can be intended as the suscepti-
bility of a single network portion or device as well as the
fragility of the whole system in relation to the failure of a
system component. This distinction is particularly crucial for
network infrastructures where the failure of one node may
trigger harmful effects even very far from the affected area,
leading to indirect damage.
Among safety critical infrastructures are freshwater sup-
ply systems (WSSs; see Table A1 for a list of acronyms
used in the paper) and water treatment plants, which can be
severely affected by floods since they rely on electric power,
mechanic devices and electronics. Water supply and sanita-
tion is widely considered to be a main factor in environmen-
tal sustainability, human health, social services and resilience
(WHO, 2011; Luh et al., 2017). In particular, water distribu-
tion networks (WDNs) are complex systems composed by
a number of subsystems in charge of abstraction from the
source, transportation, treatment and distribution. Vulnera-
ble WSS components are often located in low-lying areas or
nearby rivers, with a consequent high exposure to inunda-
tions. Flood events affecting water utilities can lead to costly
repairs, disruptions of service and public health advisories
(US Environmental Protection Agency, 2014).
The management of flood risk entails a combined ap-
proach comprising mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery (WHO, 2011). Among the mitigation activities, the
identification of hazard and a comprehensive vulnerability
analysis are recognised as pre-eminent. Risk assessment is
a fundamental support for decision makers because it in-
creases the awareness and fosters the adoption of mitiga-
tion strategies (Large et al., 2014). The implementation of
the Water Safety Plan promoted by the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) and International Water Association (IWA)
(Bartram et al., 2009) aims to harmonise hazard and risk
assessment procedures through an appropriate method. It
identifies issues of treatment plants and source water qual-
ity (Ginandjar et al., 2015) as the main hazards associated
with floods. Floods and heavy rainfall are associated with
elevated turbidity and dissolved organic matter (Göransson
et al., 2013; Murshed et al., 2014), which can affect drink-
ing water purification, the source of which is a surface water
body or storage reservoir. However, if indirect and cascade
effects are accounted for, other impacts should be consid-
ered such as those related to power outage, which is likely
to occur if electric devices, e.g. valves and lifting stations,
are affected (Khan et al., 2015). In fact, a short-term loss
of the electric power may induce pressure fluctuations or in-
termittent supply, which may lead to ingress of contamina-
tion from leakage orifices and air vacuum valves (Ebacher
et al., 2010). Thus, besides the economic costs caused by the
contamination, of the order of EUR 50 per metre of cleaned
pipe (Ellison et al., 2003), there are repercussions on social
and operational domains characterising urban water systems
(Blackmore and Plant, 2008; Hrudey et al., 2006). Hence, a
comprehensive flood risk assessment of WSSs should inte-
grate a flood model and a WSS model capable of properly
representing the network behaviour in low-pressure condi-
tions (Seyoum and Tanyimboh, 2016).
In this work, a method is implemented as to evaluate flood
impact on a WSS accounting for both direct and indirect
damage on technological systems and inhabitants. Hazard,
vulnerability and exposure of system components are as-
sessed through a semi-automated procedure integrating the
geographic information system (GIS) representation of flood
scenarios with an hydraulic network model with pressure-
driven demand (PDD). Failure scenarios are based on the
analysis of exposure and vulnerability of critical network
components, e.g. lifting stations. Two measures for the as-
sessment of flood impact are introduced and the model is
tested on a case study.
2 Materials and methods
The assessment of flood risk on a WSS requires a com-
prehensive approach including several scales of analysis
(e.g. catchment area, riverbed, distribution network) and
models in order to capture the dependencies between envi-
ronmental forcing and WSS components and the inner de-
pendencies of the WSS itself. Figure 1 depicts the logic
flow to estimate flood impacts on each component of the
WSS considering a configuration with a surface water body
source, e.g. a river. Reading the scheme clockwise, at catch-
ment scale the hydro-meteorological event (1 on the dia-
gram) bears turbidity, due to the high concentration of sus-
pended sediments, and organic matter load, both of which
affect the surface water body (2). When reaching the abstrac-
tion, the quality of source water needs to be analysed (3) to
determine whether the influent (i) is suitable for a standard
treatment, (ii) requires adjustments of the treatment process
or (iii) is not appropriate, leading to a temporary interruption
of abstraction (4). Uncontrolled or special source water qual-
ity may directly affect the treatment with possible failures
of the process sections and consequences on treatment effi-
ciency (5, 6). Treatment plants are also susceptible to failure
or restrictions if vulnerable active components are flooded.
Active components (7) are those powered by electricity such
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Table 1. Main impacts associated with flooding for WSS based on surface water source.
WSS component Direct flood impact Consequence
Abstraction
Turbidity Abstraction interruption
Organic matter load Restriction of treatment
Treatment
Power shutdown Loss or restriction of treatment works
Instrumentation failure Loss of control
Drinking water contact with floodwater Contamination
Distribution
Power shutdown Pressure fluctuations
Intermittent supply
Contamination
Active components 
Inundation model
Distribution
Flood 
Hydro-meteorological 
scenario
Flood scenario
Water distribution 
piping system model
Pressure at nodes
Exposure analysis
Outage and contamination
drinking water quality
Abstraction
Sediments and 
organic matter load
Source water 
quality analysis
 Analysis of treatment 
failure or restriction
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMNATURAL HAZARD
Treatment efficiency
Surface water body
Impacts
Treatment
List of exposed components
Influent quality
1 2
3
4
5
6
14
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Figure 1. Flood risk assessment scheme for WSS (ellipses stand for activities and rectangles represent data flow; shaded boxes represent
activities that are not carried out in this work).
as electric valves, pumps, chemical dosers, etc. The WDN,
which relies on elements sensitive to power outage (e.g. lift-
ing stations), is also affected. The inundation model (8) gen-
erates a flood scenario (9), i.e. an inundation map which al-
lows one to identify exposed objects. Exposure analysis (10)
produces a list of exposed components (11) for both WDN
and treatment, the possible failure of which should be sim-
ulated in a piping distribution system and a treatment plant
models, respectively (12). Therefore, the results of the mod-
els in terms of pressure at nodes (13) and treatment efficiency
are used to estimate the impacts on water quantity (outages
due to pressure fluctuations or intermittent supply) and qual-
ity, e.g. the risk of contamination (14). The main effects of
flood impacts are summarised in Table 1.
This work focuses on the evaluation through a numerical
model of flood impacts on the WDN, shown in the central
panel of Fig. 1. The model is composed by two main sub-
models: the inundation model and the WSS model.
2.1 Inundation model and exposure analysis
The inundation model uses a river hydrograph (either
recorded or calculated for a hydro-meteorological scenario)
to produce a raster map showing the representative flood pa-
rameters, in particular water depth. In the literature compu-
tation is commonly performed through simplified Navier–
Stokes equations with different numerical schemes and spa-
tial resolutions of the computational domain (Hunter et al.,
2008). In particular, accurate forecast of flood propagation
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in urban environments usually requires 2-D models with
an adequate description of the street-building pattern, lim-
iting the computational grid resolution to about 1 m (Apel
et al., 2009). In this context, the increasing availability of
geographic data such as lidar-derived digital terrain mod-
els (DTMs) ease the setup of the model (Fewtrell et al.,
2011). Nevertheless, some issues such as the computational
effort and the definition of representative roughness coeffi-
cients still arise. As an alternative, parsimonious hydraulic
models are also accepted as a compromise between accuracy
and computational effort when steady-state approximations
and large and cumbersome computational domains are not
sustainable (Apel et al., 2009; Arrighi et al., 2013).
The implemented hydraulic model is comprised of two
parts. Firstly, the river is represented with a 1-D unsteady
flow model and the urban flood-prone area is modelled as a
system of interconnected quasi-2-D storage cells. A digital
surface model with resolution of 1 m and vertical accuracy
of 0.25 m, derived from lidar surveys, is used for the detailed
representation of the flow domain at street-building scale;
buildings are, by default, considered to be waterproof blocks.
The computation of flood propagation is performed through
an implicit 1-D finite-difference scheme of the general equa-
tion of unsteady flow (i.e. mass and momentum conserva-
tion equations). The quasi-2-D hydraulic model for the flood-
plain consists of several storage areas (cells) connected to the
riverbanks through a set of lateral weirs, whose geometry is
extracted from a topographic survey. When the inundation
starts, the quasi-2-D module – governed by mass conserva-
tion and stage-storage relationships – calculates water levels
from the volume stored in the cell. Flow between adjacent
cells is described by a weir equation accounting for back-
water effects. The details of the model construct and equa-
tions adopted in the HEC-RAS framework (for both 1-D and
quasi-2-D modules) are described in Arrighi et al. (2013).
The increasing availability inundation maps from local wa-
ter authorities – due to the evolving normative frameworks
in flood risk management (EU Parliament, 2007) – may also
offer an alternative to numerically simulating surface flow.
In this perspective, official inundation maps can be adopted
if accessible and adequate in spatial resolution in the area of
interest.
Exposure analysis requires matching of data from inunda-
tion maps and information on location of assets, usually per-
formed by means of GIS. All the components of the WDN,
both active and passive, must therefore be geo-referenced to
be compared with inundation maps for assigned scenarios.
For the risk assessment of the WDS, exposure analysis is
conducted on active components based on the maximum wa-
ter depth occurring during the flood event. Maximum water
depth is also used to assess the potential contamination at
nodes. The selection of a suitable inundation model giving
accurate flood depths depends on the characteristics of the
domain, i.e. area and topography, although a spatial resolu-
tion of the order of 1 m (e.g. lidar-derived products) should
be preferred in urban areas to represent the street-building
pattern. Exposure analysis consists of four steps. First, the
coordinates of the WSS point components (nodes, reservoirs,
lifting stations, etc.) are exported from the WSS model to the
GIS environment so that a new vector is created whose co-
ordinate reference system is assigned in the shapefile proper-
ties. Afterwards, the raster inundation map is imported into
the GIS workspace and converted if necessary to a compat-
ible reference system. The raster cell information (i.e. water
depth) is then extracted over the point feature and added as
attribute (e.g. with the “point sampling tool” plug-in avail-
able for QGIS). For each failure-prone point component be-
longing to an exposed asset, the water depth attribute is com-
pared to a threshold depth which takes into account local ge-
ometry and functional dependencies. If calculated depth ex-
ceeds the threshold, the component is marked as failed, added
to the list of exposed asset and its properties modified in the
WSS model (Sect. 2.2) to reproduce the failed configuration.
2.2 Distribution network model
The model is based on the freely available EPANET libraries,
which calculate time-varying pressures at the nodes given a
set of initial tank levels, pump switching criteria, base nodal
demands and demand patterns. In particular, EPANET can be
launched by other software through a set of DLL libraries.
One drawback of the standard EPANET implementation is
its strict demand-driven approach, which stems from the pri-
mary goal of simulating correctly operated networks. In such
networks, pressure at each node is sufficient so as to allow
withdrawal of required flow rate from each node, so that de-
mands can be assumed as defined input data. However, when
simulating strongly off-design networks, nodes featuring a
reduced pressure are quite common, so that a PDD approach
is needed (Cheung et al., 2005; Walski et al., 2017). PDD
models differ from conventional ones in that nodal demands
are not attributed a priori; instead, their value depends on
the current local pressure. In particular, and consistently with
practice, the model assumes that each node is in one of three
states:
– Fully served: if Hi ≥Hservice, the node is able to with-
draw its nominal demand.
– Partially served: if Hservice>Hi > 0, the node with-
draws a reduced demand, which can be expressed as
Di =Dnom,i
(
Hi
Hservice
)α
, (1)
where α is a constant exponent set to 0.5.
– Non-served: if P = 0, the node is unable to withdraw
any water, yielding null demand.
EPANET allows two types of nodes: nodes are assigned
a time-varying, pressure-independent demand and can be ef-
fectively used to model fully served users, whereas emitters,
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conceived to model fixed cross-section water outlets such
as fire hoses and orifices, adequately model the aforemen-
tioned behaviour of partially served users. Emitters are de-
fined by a fixed exponent α, equal for all instances, and a
flow coefficient which represents the volume flow rate for
unitary pressure loss across the orifice. Unfortunately, emit-
ters do not cope well with calculated negative pressures, at-
tributing a negative (entering) flow rate where such negative
pressures occur. In order to cope with this issue, a MATLAB
code has been implemented so as to run transient simulation
while correctly using a PDD approach. The code, as shown
in Fig. 2, works as follows. Three node states are defined:
“2” for served nodes, “1” for partially served ones and “0” for
non-served ones; type 2 and type 0 nodes are modelled as
EPANET nodes with nominal demand equal to the assigned
nominal demandDi and nought, respectively, whereas type 1
nodes are modelled as emitters whose flow coefficients are
calculated to ensure that Di =Dnom,i if Hi =Hservice.
Overall, the model works as follows: for each time step, a
first trial simulation is run with all nodes in state 2 in order to
get the expected pressures. Afterwards, each node is checked
to assess whether its pressure is in the pressure range corre-
sponding to the current flow regimen and, if this is not the
case, its state is accordingly raised or lowered by one unit
(namely, it is not possible to jump from state 2 to state 0 and
vice versa). After node states have been changed, simulation
is repeated until no more state change is necessary. Calcu-
lated flow rates and pressures are considered to represent net-
work operation during the subsequent time step. In particu-
lar, flow rates are used to calculate the time to the next event
(tank being filled or drained), and the first event affecting
network topology is considered (e.g. demand change, pump
setting toggling due to time pattern, tank becoming empty or
full). Tank levels are thus updated and simulation proceeds
to the next time step. The described procedure allows for cal-
culating pressure and supplied demand at each node for each
time step, therefore fully estimating the network state in each
moment.
Model initialisation
The model, featuring non-memoryless elements (tanks),
needs to be correctly initialised. In normal operation, tank
levels undergo a daily pattern of filling and emptying, ac-
cording to demands and water availability. In order to ap-
propriately initialise tank levels, a warm-up simulation is run
by randomly initialising tank levels and checking their value
every 24 h. If the calculated levels differ from those corre-
sponding to 24 h before by less than a tolerance parameter,
the model is considered to be in steady state and water level
for each tank and time value are saved in a matrix, which can
thereafter be used to initialise the values for the forthcoming
simulations.
  
Initialise nodes to state “2”
EPANET run
Calculate next timestep
and update tanks
Proceed to
next timestep
Update node statesNodal headsconsistent?
Sim length
reached?
Start at time 0
Sim stop
y
n
y
n
Figure 2. Diagram of PDD model implementation.
2.3 Definition of impact measures
Two measures have been defined in order to evaluate the
global impact of the flood on network operativeness and in-
tegrity.
First, impact of the flood on network operation is assessed
through evaluation of the number of inhabitants experiencing
lack of service. To this aim, data about population density
in the area made available by the Italian Institute of Statis-
tics (ISTAT, 2011) are used. Such data define 2186 polygo-
nal zones with areas ranging from 156 to 2.48× 106 m2) and
provide a population value for each of them. Inhabitants are
assigned to nodes as follows: a uniform demand per capita
is assumed in each area and calculated, and the number of
inhabitants for each node pertaining to that area is estimated
accordingly. In particular,
Pi∈A = Dnom,i∑
k∈A
Dnom,k
PA, (2)
where Pi is the population assigned to node i belonging to
area A and PA is the total population of area A. The popu-
lation not served, (PNS), parameter is thus estimated as the
total population of nodes with reduced or null pressure, i.e.
PNS =
∑
i∈I
Pi with I = {i|Hi <Hservice} , (3)
where Hservice is the minimum head required to consider a
node fully served (5.0 m in the case study).
As a second measure, network damage due to pipe con-
tamination is evaluated by calculating the total length of
pipework to be decontaminated. A pipe is considered to be
contaminated if at any point in time the head inside the pipe
is lower than the floodwater head outside or below zero, i.e.
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Figure 3. Flooded area for the four recurrence intervals and exposure of vulnerable components. Areas with water depth above 0.01 m are
considered to be flooded). Reference coordinate system is EPSG:3003.
L=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
Lj with I = {i|Hi <max(Hflood,0)} , (4)
where Ji is the set of pipes with either end connected to
node i.
3 Case study
3.1 Flood scenarios
The study area is the municipality of Florence, Italy, with
an areal extent of 102 km2. The area hosts about 380 000 in-
habitants, the highest population density being found in the
city centre along the Arno riverbanks. Documents indicate
that the town has a long account of floods since the Mid-
dle Ages, as confirmed by more recent hydrologic–hydraulic
studies (Caporali et al., 2005) showing that floods may oc-
cur also for low recurrence interval (30-year return period).
For such frequent events, only the lower-lying suburbs are af-
fected (brown areas on the centre left side of Fig. 8), whereas
more severe scenarios (recurrence interval of over 200 years)
affect the whole city including the historic centre. Flood risk
in the study area is estimated in EUR 55 million a−1 when
only direct tangible losses to buildings, household contents
and commercial activities are taken into account (Arrighi
et al., 2016). In this context, analysis of flood risk to the WSS
is crucial to understand the potential adverse consequences
on such strategic infrastructures and to estimate the recovery
costs.
The metre-scale DTM used for the hydraulic model
is freely available in the regional cartographic repository
(dati.toscana.it/dataset/lidar). The hydraulic data (hydro-
graphs and river water profiles) are made available by the
catchment authority (Autorità di Bacino del Fiume Arno),
which is in charge of flood risk management and water re-
source planning.
Four flood scenarios with different recurrence inter-
vals (RIs) are considered when applying the method de-
scribed in Sect. 2: a frequent scenario (RI= 30 years), two
medium recurrence intervals (100 and 200 years) and a rare
scenario (500 years). Accordingly, four inundation raster
maps are generated to carry out the exposure analysis.
3.2 Water distribution system
The studied WSS features one main treatment facility,
17 tanks and the pipework to supply drinking water for do-
mestic and industrial use.
Freshwater supply is ensured by the river, which flows
westbound amidst the urban area. Water is abstracted from
the river by three 373 kW pumps in the treatment plant “An-
conella”, which is located in the left bank and designed to
process 4 m3 s−1 (Fig. 3). The water undergoes treatment and
reaches the lifting station, where six 710 kW pumps ensure a
maximum head of 60 m and feed the distribution network.
The storage tanks are mostly located at high altitudes and
feature a total operative volume of 48 620 m3.
An EPANET model of the WSS is provided by the utility
operator Publiacqua SpA. The model is barely skeletonised
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and consists of 4863 nodes and 12 436 pipes for a total length
of the modelled piping network of 619 km.
The WSS elements most vulnerable to floods are the lift-
ing stations and the pumps feeding the storage tanks, because
they rely on electrical power and are affected by power out-
age. Water depth at the location of vulnerable WDS com-
ponents is compared to a threshold depth to define the op-
eration state of each of them. In this work, a threshold of
0.5 m is defined, so components experiencing greater depths
are considered failed and switched off in the water distribu-
tion model. The 0.5 m threshold has been identified based on
the judgement of experts who undertook a “what-if” analy-
sis to evaluate the vulnerability of active components. This
threshold has been considered conservative with respect to
the mean position of electric and electronic devices observed
in the plants.
4 Results
In this section, results of the analyses are shown. The section
is divided into three subsections. Firstly, flood hazard sce-
narios are illustrated and the exposure analysis of the WSS
components is described; two failure scenarios with differ-
ent residual functionality of the exposed lifting station are
selected (Sect. 4.1). Secondly, the dynamics of the WDN
are described, namely the temporal evolution of pressure at
nodes and volume in the tanks; population not served, PNS,
and contaminated pipe length, L, measures are shown for
the two failure scenarios (Sect. 4.2). Finally, the results of
a sensitivity analysis of the WDN with respect to tank levels
are presented (Sect. 4.3), since the role of the tank levels is
crucial to satisfying demand during the transient after power
outage.
4.1 Flood and failure scenarios
Figure 3 shows the results of hazard analysis. For the 30-
year RI an area of 2.5 km2 is flooded, with an average water
depth of 1 m. Two areas are affected, one upstream of the
historic city on the right bank (right-hand side of Fig. 3) and
one downstream on the left bank (left-hand side of Fig. 3.
In the upstream area flood depth is about 0.3 m, whereas in
the downstream area water depth locally attains 4 m in cor-
respondence of excavation zones. For the 100-year RI, the
flooded area increases to 12.7 km2 with an average flood
depth of about 1 m. In the downstream area, the right bank is
also inundated with depth up to 2.5 m. For higher RI (200 and
500 years), the affected areas rise to 20 and 27 km2 and aver-
age depths to 1.2 and 1.7 m, respectively. In these scenarios
the historic district is also affected (centre of Fig. 3) with wa-
ter depth as high as 4 m. In the downstream areas water depth
locally exceeds 4 m (see Fig. 4 for an example of 500-year RI
inundation).
Table 2. Summary of exposed components.
Recurrence Inundated Depth at Depth at
interval area lifting VCMantigna
(years) (km2) station (m)
(m)
30 2.5 0 0
100 12.7 0.85 0.15
200 20.5 0.90 0.73
500 27.8 1.50 2.00
Table 2 shows the results of the exposure analysis. For
RI= 30 years, none of the vulnerable WSS components is af-
fected. For RI= 100 years, the tank labelled “VCMantigna”
is exposed to flood, yet the average flood depth in a buffer
zone of 25 m radius is about 0.15 m, and therefore the elec-
trical devices are assumed in operation. For RI= 200 and
500 years, the drinking water treatment plant (DWTP) in An-
conella, shown in the right-hand side of Fig. 3, is flooded
with a water depth exceeding 0.85 m. In these scenarios, is-
sues are expected because of drinking water treatment re-
strictions, loss of control and power shutdown of the lifting
station. The VCMantigna tank is still exposed, with water
depths as high as 2 m for RI= 500 years.
4.2 WDN dynamics and impact metrics
Results are shown relative to the 200- and 500-year recur-
rence intervals, those for which failure of the DWTP is ex-
pected. In particular, two scenarios are considered: in sce-
nario 1, it is assumed that the DWTP completely stops pro-
viding freshwater to the system; in scenario 2, some backup
system is assumed to keep one of the three main pumps feed-
ing the network in operation.
The nodal heads 120 min after the lifting station failure
are shown in Fig. 4 for failure scenarios 1 (Fig. 4a) and 2
(Fig. 4b). At 120 min after the shutdown in the failure sce-
nario 1 (Fig. 4a), about 50 % of nodes already experience
heads lower that 1 m, where just three zones, one in the west-
ernmost part of the network (due to the lower altitude favour-
ing piezometric head) and two on the northern and southern
hills (due to local tanks providing capacity; see Sect. 4.3),
feature heads higher than 20 m. After 6 h (Fig. 5), the num-
ber of served nodes is further reduced, with only the west-
ernmost part of the network and southern hills (low altitude
and higher with a great number of tanks, respectively) being
served. For what concerns failure scenario 2 (Fig. 4b), most
nodes of the network are operational after 120 min from the
shutdown, with pressures in the minimum range of residual
level of service (1–10 m). A few nodes on the northern hills
(about 15 %) experience heads lower than 1 m and a signif-
icant part of the western city on the right bank experiences
heads between 10 and 200 m due to its low elevation. In both
cases the service disruption due to insufficient head also af-
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Figure 4. Inundation map and nodal heads for the 500-year recurrence interval, 120 min after lifting station failure, for (a) scenario 1 (no
pumps on) and (b) scenario 2 (one pump on). Reference coordinate system is EPSG:WGS84.
fects nodes outside the inundated area, and hence it can be
accounted for as an indirect impact of the flood triggered by
the failure of the lifting station.
Evolution of aggregate service metrics in time is calcu-
lated for the two aforementioned failure scenarios. PNS is
shown in the panels of Fig. 5 as a fraction of total popula-
tion. In failure scenario 1 (Fig. 5a), the complete shutdown
of the DWTP pumping station deprives almost 50 % of the
population of water supply after 3 h, consistent with the dy-
namics shown in Sect. 4.2. After 6 h, this condition extends to
the 70 %. If inhabitants experiencing insufficient pressure are
also considered, total affected population is about 90 %. In
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Figure 5. PNS as a fraction of total population in failure sce-
nario 1 (a) and failure scenario 2 (b).
failure scenario 2 (Fig. 5b), total affected population ranges
from 62 to 77 %. Nevertheless, inhabitants experiencing no
service at all are about 15 %, rising to less than 30 % only
after 9 h. Population not served by the WDN exemplifies the
large gap between direct and indirect flood impacts. In fact,
for the 200- and 500-year flood scenarios, residents directly
affected only account for 35.6 and 44.8 % of total population,
respectively. This means that inhabitants indirectly affected
(by the WSS failure) are two to three times as much as those
directly flooded. For what concerns evaluation of network
damage, the panels of Fig. 6 show the length of contami-
nated pipe as a function of time for the two studied failure
scenarios. Again, scenario 1 (Fig. 6a) shows a critical situa-
tion, where about 25 % of the network undergoes contamina-
tion risk shortly after the shutdown and 68 % of the network
is out of service just 6 h afterwards. In scenario 2 (Fig. 6b),
the contaminated pipe length fraction rises from 9 to 26 % in
the first 12 h, thus suggesting a milder impact. Nevertheless,
caution must be taken for the risk of backflow towards nodes
which lie on the borders of the served areas. In principle,
contaminated pipe length does depend of the RI considered,
since higher floodwater depth leads to higher contamination
risk. Nevertheless, results show that in the studied case there
Figure 6. Contaminated pipe length in failure scenario 1 (a) and in
failure scenario 2 (b).
is little difference between the 200- and 500-year recurrence
intervals.
If a pipe has been contaminated it needs to be disin-
fected before being put in service again. Disinfection is
usually achieved by flushing: trailer-mounted equipment
pumps a disinfecting solution (e.g. liquid chlorine or sodium
hypochlorite) through a closed piping loop. Firstly, service
laterals are closed and customers are connected to bypass
piping. Subsequently, the cleaning solution is pumped from a
tank on the equipment trailer into the pipe to be cleaned. Af-
ter cleaning, the solution is neutralised and pumped to a san-
itary sewer. The entire system is then flushed (including lat-
erals) to eliminate sediments and completely remove the dis-
infecting fluid. From the operational point of view, discharge
is monitored during the flushing to assure a sufficient contact
time and chlorine residuals after disinfection are recorded
to meet the sanitary standards. An order-of-magnitude esti-
mation of the cost of the disinfection–flushing operation is
EUR 50 per metre of cleaned pipe (Ellison et al., 2003); nev-
ertheless, during contingencies, costs may increase due to
the disproportion between available and needed resources.
According to calculated values of contaminated pipe length,
flood damage to the WDN can be estimated in EUR 21 and
8 million for failure scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, which
correspond to approximately 0.5 and 0.2 % of the direct
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Figure 7. Volume stored in tanks as a function of time since failure.
losses to buildings and contents for the 200-year flood sce-
nario estimated in Arrighi et al. (2016).
Figure 7 shows the water volume stored in the tank sys-
tem at a given time after the failure. In scenario 1, where no
water is provided by the DWTP, the entire demand is met
by withdrawing water from the tank system. This is high-
lighted by the average slope of the curve in the first 3 h (about
0.75 m3 s−1), which corresponds to half of the total demand
in normal conditions. After about 3 and 5 h, reservoir config-
uration changes so that the average slope of the volume of
the tanks is also affected. Slope changes in both curves are
caused both by demand variations and tanks being drained.
In particular, the abrupt change for failure scenario 1 after
about 5 h corresponds to a tank serving a great number of
nodes being drained, thus corresponding in sudden change
in served demand (slope). The relationship between served
demand and curve slope is not so evident for failure sce-
nario 2, since slope curve only relates to those users not di-
rectly served by the DWTP.
4.3 Sensitivity to tank levels
In case of power shutdown, the transient behaviour of the
system is determined by the amount of water stored in tanks.
In order to better understand the relevance of each storage
tank in the system, a sensitivity analysis has been performed.
In particular, a sensitivity matrix is calculated by numerically
computing the derivative of head of each node with respect
on the level of each tank in a quasi-static assumption. By ex-
amining the resulting data, two types of tanks are identified,
according to their altitude. On the one hand, variations of
water levels in low-altitude tanks strongly impact most net-
work nodes, as shown in Fig. 8a, where the sensitivity to the
VCMantigna storage tank is depicted. The nodes of the net-
work lying at elevations in the range 25–50 m – which largely
outnumber the rest – undergo pressure variations of about
0.5–1 m for a 1 m variation of tank level. On the other hand,
high-altitude tanks, like the one labelled “Arcetri” shown in
Fig. 8b, have a smaller area of influence limited to the imme-
diate surroundings of the tank itself. This is also reflected by
the longer service periods experienced by nodes pertaining
to this areas, which share a locally abundant resource.
5 Conclusions
The impact of extreme weather events and natural disasters
on urban structures and technological infrastructures, as well
as in the perspective of climate change, is causing rising in-
terest of citizens and institutions. In particular, the estima-
tion of damage to network infrastructures poses an additional
challenge due to the highly connected physical and func-
tional topology by which the detrimental effects spread to ar-
eas farther from the event location and lead to indirect losses.
In this work, a comprehensive methodology to assess the
impact of a flood on a WSS is defined and implemented in
a semi-automated fashion. In particular, two main submod-
els are used: (i) an inundation model, which uses hydro-
meteorological data and a DTM to compute flood depth
given the flood recurrence interval (hazard analysis); and (ii)
a WSS hydraulic model, used to simulate fluid-dynamic be-
haviour of the network from topology, functional and de-
mand data. Initially, a flood scenario is calculated by the
inundation model, and water depths near the active WSS
components (pumps, electrically operated valve, etc.) are ex-
tracted. The failure of active components is linked to a se-
lected safety threshold for flood depth, here assumed equal to
0.5 m. If water depth near an active component exceeds the
given safety threshold, the component is considered failed
(exposure analysis) and its state is modified accordingly in
the WSS model. Thereafter, the WSS model is run and nodal
pressures are calculated. In this phase, users experiencing
lack of service are identified as a function of time. Moreover,
by comparing water pressure in the network with local flood
depth, areas affected by backflow are identified. Finally, cal-
culated data are aggregated to compute two time-dependent
measures which quantify the global lack of service (through
the number of affected users) and global contamination ex-
tent (through the total length of pipes undergoing backflow).
The described method is applied to a case study. The study
area hosts about 380 000 inhabitants on an area of 102 km2.
The domestic water need (about 121 000 m3 day−1) is met
by a WSS which abstracts the resource from the Arno River,
which flows through the town. It is found that flood events
with a recurrence intervals greater or equal to 100 years are
those which affect functionality and safety of the WSS by
causing power disruption to the main lifting station. Two
failure scenarios are defined and analysed, considering zero
or one pump in operation, respectively. Inundation maps of
the area and service maps of the WDN are produced, thus
identifying the most critical zones and the service disruption
patterns in the two scenarios. Results show that providing a
backup system to keep one of the pump in operation would
largely reduce the affected population (by about 40 %). As
regards as the contamination of the pipework by floodwater,
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Figure 8. Digital elevation model of the study area and sensitivity to tank level for a lower tank (VCMantigna) (a) and for a upper tank
(Arcetri) (b). Reference coordinate system is EPSG:3003.
in the worst-case scenario it is estimated that 68 to 100 % of
the network undergoes backflow risk depending on event du-
ration, whereas the aforementioned improvement would re-
duce this value by 60%, with first-estimate savings of about
EUR 13 million. Sensitivity of nodal head to tank levels is
also studied, thus identifying influence areas of the various
storage facilities. Although economic losses to the WDN,
i.e. the cost of cleaning the pipework, are almost negligible
with respect to the direct losses to buildings, their contents
and artworks estimated in a previous work (Arrighi et al.,
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2016), the calculation of the impact on population reveals
that for a 200-year flood and worst failure scenario there are
three times as many inhabitants experiencing a lack of fresh-
water than those directly flooded. This also has crucial impli-
cations on the post-emergency management and civil protec-
tion actions since interventions are also required outside the
inundated area.
The implemented methodology uses flood data (WSS
topology and characteristics) and water demand data to com-
pute WSS contamination risk maps and service maps at var-
ious time moments after the event. The model is automated
and lightweight, the analysis being completed in few min-
utes, and can be effectively used in the strategic planning
of disaster recovery procedures or in comparing network
strengthening solutions in budget allocation activities.
Future developments may include studying the effect of
first-intervention procedures (e.g. subzoning of the network
to select specific areas to be contaminated while preserving
operation in others) and extending the model to simulate re-
covery procedures so that recovery times and transient net-
work behaviour can be estimated based on scheduling and
available resources.
Data availability. The data underlying the research are available as
a Supplement (∗.csv files).
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Appendix A: Acronyms used in the paper
Acronym Definition
DTM Digital terrain model
DWTP Domestic water treatment plant
Lidar Light detection and ranging
PDD Pressure-driven demand
RI Recurrence interval
WDN Water distribution network
WSS Water supply system
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supplement.
Author contributions. CA conceived the impact assessment
methodology and was responsible of flood hazard, exposure
assessment, GIS operations and mapping. FT implemented the
PDD code, simulated the piping network and evaluated the impact
metrics. EV supervised the network modelling and FC promoted
the research and supervised the flood risk aspects.
Competing interests. The authors declare that they have no conflict
of interest.
Acknowledgements. We acknowledge Publiacqua SpA for provid-
ing the sample network data and for the advice given as stakeholder.
This research was financially supported by Fondazione
Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze under the research pro-
gramme “ECRFI 2014”.
Edited by: Bruno Merz
Reviewed by: two anonymous referees
References
Apel, H., Aronica, G. T., Kreibich, H., and Thieken, A. H.: Flood
risk analyses – How detailed do we need to be?, Nat. Hazards,
49, 79–98, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-008-9277-8, 2009.
Arrighi, C., Brugioni, M., Castelli, F., Franceschini, S., and Maz-
zanti, B.: Urban micro-scale flood risk estimation with parsi-
monious hydraulic modelling and census data, Nat. Hazards
Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 1375–1391, https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-
13-1375-2013, 2013.
Arrighi, C., Brugioni, M., Castelli, F., Franceschini, S., and
Mazzanti, B.: Flood risk assessment in art cities: The ex-
emplary case of Florence (Italy), J. Flood Risk Manage.,
https://doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12226, in press, 2016.
Ashley, S. T. and Ashley, W. S.: Flood fatalities in the
United States, J. Appl. Meteorol. Clim., 47, 805–818,
https://doi.org/10.1175/2007JAMC1611.1, 2008.
Bartram, J., Corrales, L., Davison, A., Deere, D., Drury, D., Gor-
don, B., Howard, G., Rinehold, A., and Stevens, M.: Water
Safety Plan Manual: Step-by-step risk management for drinking-
water suppliers, World Health Organization, Geneva, p. 108,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-1688.1970.tb00528.x, 2009.
Blackmore, J. M. and Plant, R. A. J.: Risk and Resilience
to Enhance Sustainability with Application to Urban Wa-
ter Systems, J. Water Resour. Pl. Manage., 134, 224–233,
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9496(2008)134:3(224),
2008.
Caporali, E., Rinaldi, M., and Casagli, N.: The Arno River
floods, Giornale di Geologia Applicata, 1, 177–192,
https://doi.org/10.1474/GGA.2005-01.0-18.0018, 2005.
Cheung, P., Van Zyl, J., and Reis, L.: Extension of EPANET for
pressure driven demand modeling in water distribution system,
Comput. Control Water Indust., 1, 311–316, 2005.
Christodoulou, S. E.: Water Resources Conservancy and Risk Re-
duction Under Climatic Instability, Water Resour. Manage., 25,
1059–1062, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-010-9770-1, 2011.
Cruz, A. M., Steinberg, L. J., Vetere Arellano, A. L., Nord-
vik, J.-P., and Pisano, F.: State of the Art in Natech Risk
Management, European Commission, Joint Research Centre
technical report, 66 pp., available at: http://www.unisdr.org/
files/2631_FinalNatechStateofthe20Artcorrected.pdf (last ac-
cess: 4 May 2017), 2004.
de Moel, H., van Alphen, J., and Aerts, J. C. J. H.: Flood
maps in Europe – methods, availability and use, Nat. Hazards
Earth Syst. Sci., 9, 289–301, https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-9-
289-2009, 2009.
Ebacher, G., Besner, M.-C., and Prevost, M.: Negative Pressure
Events in Water Distribution Systems: Public Health Risk As-
sessment Based on Transient Analysis Outputs (ASCE), ASCE,
Published in Water Distribution Systems Analysis 2010, 471–
483, https://doi.org/10.1061/41203(425)45, 2010.
Ellison, D., Duranceau, P., Ancel, S., Deagle, G., and McCoy, R.:
Investigation of pipe cleaning methods, vol. 1, AWWA Research
Foundation and American Water Works Association, USA, http:
//wwwtest.waterrf.org/PostingReportLibrary/90938.pdf (last ac-
cess: 4 May 2017), 2003.
Emanuelsson, M. A. E., Mcintyre, N., Hunt, C. F., Mawle,
R., Kitson, J., and Voulvoulis, N.: Flood risk assessment for
infrastructure networks, J. Flood Risk Manage., 7, 31–41,
https://doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12028, 2014.
EU Parliament: Directive 2007/60/EC, 2007.
Fewtrell, T. J., Duncan, A., Sampson, C. C., Neal, J. C., and Bates, P.
D.: Benchmarking urban flood models of varying complexity and
scale using high resolution terrestrial LiDAR data, Phys. Chem.
Earth, 36, 281–291, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2010.12.011,
2011.
Gil, J. and Steinbach, P.: From flood risk to indirect flood impact:
Evaluation of street network performance for effective manage-
ment, response and repair, WIT T. Ecol. Environ., 118, 335–344,
https://doi.org/10.2495/FRIAR080321, 2008.
Ginandjar, P., Saraswati, L. D., Pangestuti, D. R., Jati, S.
P., and Rahfiludin, Z.: Risk Assessment of Drinking Wa-
ter Supply System in the Tidal Inundation Area of Se-
marang – Indonesia, Proced. Environ. Sci., 23, 93–98,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proenv.2015.01.014, 2015.
Göransson, G., Larson, M., and Bendz, D.: Variation in turbid-
ity with precipitation and flow in a regulated river system-river
Göta Älv, SW Sweden, Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 17, 2529–2542,
https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-17-2529-2013, 2013.
Hrudey, S. E., Hrudey, E. J., and Pollard, S. J. T.: Risk manage-
ment for assuring safe drinking water, Environ. Int., 32, 948–957,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2006.06.004, 2006.
Hunter, N., Bates, P., Neelz, S., Pender, G., Villanueva, I., Wright,
N., Liang, D., Falconer, R., Lin, B., Waller, S., Crossley, A. J.,
and Mason, D.: Benchmarking 2D hydraulic models for urban
flooding, Proc. Institut. Civ. Eng.: Water Manage., 161, 13–30,
https://doi.org/10.1680/wama.2008.161.1.13, 2008.
IPCC: Summary for Policymakers, Climate Change 2013:
The Physical Science Basis, in: Contribution of Work-
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 17, 2109–2123, 2017 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/17/2109/2017/
C. Arrighi et al.: Flood impacts on a water distribution network 2123
ing Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p. 33,
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324, 2013.
Khan, S. J., Deere, D., Leusch, F. D. L., Humpage, A.,
Jenkins, M., and Cunliffe, D.: Extreme weather events:
Should drinking water quality management systems adapt
to changing risk profiles?, Water Res., 85, 124–136,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.watres.2015.08.018, 2015.
Large, A., Le Gat, Y., Elacachi, S., Renaud, E., and Breysse, D.: De-
cision support tools: review of risk models in drinking water net-
work asset management, Vulnerability, Uncertainty and risk, in:
2nd International Conference on Vulnerability and Risk Analysis
and Management (ICVRAM) and 6th International Symposium
on Uncertainty Modelling and Analysis (ISUMA), July 2014,
Liverpool, UK, 587–597, 2014.
Lhomme, S., Serre, D., Diab, Y., and Laganier, R.: Analyzing re-
silience of urban networks: a preliminary step towards more
flood resilient cities, Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 221–230,
https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-13-221-2013, 2013.
Luh, J., Royster, S., Sebastian, D., Ojomo, E., and Bartram, J.: Ex-
pert assessment of the resilience of drinking water and sanita-
tion systems to climate-related hazards, Sci. Total Environ., 592,
334–344, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.03.084, 2017.
Lung, T., Lavalle, C., Hiederer, R., Dosio, A., and Bouwer,
L. M.: A multi-hazard regional level impact assessment
for Europe combining indicators of climatic and non-
climatic change, Global Environ. Change, 23, 522–536,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.11.009, 2013.
ISTAT: 15 Censimento della popolazione e delle abitazioni,
Tech. rep., http://www.istat.it (last access: 4 May 2017), 2011.
Merz, B., Kreibich, H., Schwarze, R., and Thieken, A.: Review
article “assessment of economic flood damage”, Nat. Hazards
Earth Syst. Sci., 10, 1697–1724, https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-
10-1697-2010, 2010.
Meyer, V. and Messner, F.: National flood damage evaluation
methods : A review of applied methods in England, the Nether-
lands, the Czech republic and Germany, FLOODsite Project
Report, p. 49, available at: https://www.cepri.net/tl_files/pdf/
meyermesner2005surveyonnationalflooddamageevaluationmethod.
pdf (last access: 30 November 2017), 2005.
Meyer, V., Becker, N., Markantonis, V., Schwarze, R., Van Den
Bergh, J. C. J. M., Bouwer, L. M., Bubeck, P., Ciavola, P.,
Genovese, E., Green, C., Hallegatte, S., Kreibich, H., Lequeux,
Q., Logar, I., Papyrakis, E., Pfurtscheller, C., Poussin, J., Przy-
luski, V., Thieken, A. H., and Viavattene, C.: Review arti-
cle: Assessing the costs of natural hazards-state of the art and
knowledge gaps, Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 1351–1373,
https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-13-1351-2013, 2013.
Michielsen, A., Kalantari, Z., Lyon, S. W., and Liljegren, E.: Pre-
dicting and communicating flood risk of transport infrastructure
based on watershed characteristics, J. Environ. Manage., 182,
505–518, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.07.051, 2016.
Murshed, M. F., Aslam, Z., Lewis, R., Chow, C., Wang, D., Drikas,
M., and van Leeuwen, J.: Changes in the quality of river water
before, during and after a major flood event associated with a La
Ni??a cycle and treatment for drinking purposes, J. Environ. Sci.,
26, 1985–1993, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jes.2014.08.001, 2014.
Serre, D., Lhomme, S., Heilemann, K., Hafskjold, L. S., Tagg, A.,
Walliman, N., and Diab, Y.: Assessing vulnerability to floods of
the built environment – Integrating urban networks and build-
ings, VRAM 2011 and ISUMA 2011 Conferences, 746–753,
https://doi.org/10.1061/41170(400)91, 2011.
Seyoum, A. G. and Tanyimboh, T. T.: Investigation into the
Pressure-Driven Extension of the EPANET Hydraulic Simula-
tion Model for Water Distribution Systems, Water Resour. Man-
age., 30, 5351–5367, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-016-1492-
6, 2016.
Short, M. D., Peirson, W. L., Peters, G. M., and Cox,
R. J.: Managing adaptation of urban water systems in a
changing climate, Water Resour. Manage., 26, 1953–1981,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0002-8, 2012.
Smith, D.: 1994 flood damage estimation – A review of urban stage-
damage curves and loss function, Water SA, 20, 231–238, 1994.
Thieken, A., Merz, B., Kreibich, H., and Apel, H.: Meth-
ods for flood risk assessment: concepts and challenges, In-
ternational Workshop on Flash Floods in Urban Areas, 1–
12, http://www.rcuwm.org.ir/En/Events/Documents/Workshops/
Articles/8/6.pdf (last access: 4 May 2017), 2006.
US Environmental Protection Agency: Flood Resilience Check-
list, p. 6, available at: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2014-07/documents/flood-resilience-checklist.pdf (last access:
30 November 2017), 2014.
Walski, T., Blakley, D., Evans, M., and Whitman, B.: Verifying
Pressure Dependent Demand Modeling, Proced. Eng., 186, 364–
371, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2017.03.230, 2017.
WHO: Guidance on Water Supply and Sanitation
In Extreme Weather Events, p. 132, http://www.
euro.who.int/en/health-topics/environment-and-health/
water-and-sanitation/publications/2011/
guidance-on-water-supply-and-sanitation-in-extreme-weather-events
(last access: 4 May 2017), 2011.
World Economic Forum: The Global Risks Report 2017, 12th Edn.,
Insight Report, World Economic Forum, Geneva, 2017.
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/17/2109/2017/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 17, 2109–2123, 2017
